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Abstract
This paper introduces, philosophically and to a de-
gree formally, the novel concept of learning ex ni-
hilo, intended (obviously) to be analogous to the
concept of creation ex nihilo. Learning ex nihilo is
an agent’s learning “from nothing,” by the suitable
employment of schemata for deductive and induc-
tive reasoning. This reasoning must be in machine-
verifiable accord with a formal proof/argument
theory in a cognitive calculus (i.e., roughly, an
intensional higher-order multi-operator quantified
logic), and this reasoning is applied to percepts re-
ceived by the agent, in the context of both some
prior knowledge, and some prior and current inter-
ests. Learning ex nihilo is a challenge to contem-
porary forms of ML, indeed a severe one, but the
challenge is offered in the spirt of seeking to stim-
ulate attempts, on the part of non-logicist ML re-
searchers and engineers, to collaborate with those
in possession of learning-ex nihilo frameworks, and
eventually attempts to integrate directly with such
frameworks at the implementation level. Such inte-
gration will require, among other things, the sym-
biotic interoperation of state-of-the-art automated
reasoners and high-expressivity planners, with sta-
tistical/connectionist ML technology.
1 Introduction
This paper introduces, philosophically and to a degree logico-
mathematically, the novel concept of learning ex nihilo, in-
tended (obviously) to be analogous to the concept of cre-
ation ex nihilo.1 Learning ex nihilo is an agent’s learning
“from nothing,” by the suitable employment of schemata for
deductive and inductive reasoning. This reasoning must be
in machine-verifiable accord with a formal proof/argument
theory in a cognitive calculus, and this reasoning is applied
to percepts received by the agent, in the context of both
some prior knowledge, and some prior and current interests.
Roughly, cognitive calculi include inferential components of
intensional higher-order multi-operator quantified logics, in
1No such assumption as that creation ex nihilo is real or even
formally respectable is made or needed in the present paper.
which expressivity far outstrips off-the-shelf modal logics
and possible-worlds semantics, and a number of such calculi
have been introduced as bases for AI that is unrelated to learn-
ing; e.g. see (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017a). The very
first cognitive calculus, replete with a corresponding imple-
mentation in ML, was introduced in (Arkoudas & Bringsjord
2009).)
Learning ex nihilo is a challenge to contemporary forms
of ML, indeed a severe one, but the challenge is offered in
the spirt of seeking to stimulate attempts, on the part of non-
logicist ML researchers and engineers, to collaborate with
those in possession of learning ex nihilo frameworks, and
eventually attempts to integrate directly with such frame-
works at the implementation level. Such integration will re-
quire, among other things, the symbiotic use of state-of-the-
art automated reasoners (such as ShadowReasoner, the par-
ticular reasoner that for us powers learning ex nihilo) with
statistical/connectionist ML technology.
2 A Starting Parable
Consider, for instance, Robert, a person of the human variety2
who has just arrived for a black-tie dinner party at a massive
and manicured stone mansion to which he has never been,
hosted by a couple (who have told him they own the home)
he has never met, and is soon seated at an elegant table, ev-
ery seat of which is occupied by a diner Robert is now meet-
ing for the very first time.3 A thin, tall, crystal glass of his
(arrayed among three others, each of a different shape, that
are his as well) is gradually filled with liquid poured from
a bottle that he notices carries the words ‘Louis Roederer,’
which have no particular meaning for him; as the pour un-
folds, Robert notices tiny bubbles in the liquid in his glass,
2The concept of personhood is a mental one that rides well above
such merely biological categories as Homo sapiens sapiens. In a
dash of insight and eloquence, Charniak & McDermott (1985) de-
clare that “the ultimate goal of AI is to build a person” (p. 7) —
from which we can deduce that personhood is in no way inseparably
bound up with the particular carbon-based human case. The logico-
computational modeling of reasoning at the level of persons, crucial
for learning ex nihilo, along with a synoptic account of personhood
itself, is provided in (Bringsjord 2008).
3Robert does know himself (and in fact self-knowledge is essen-
tial for learning ex nihilo), but, again, he doesn’t know any of the
other diners.
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and the white-tuxedoed server says, “Your apertif, sir.” At
this point, Robert is in position to learn an infinite number of
propositions ex nihilo. He has received no large dataset, and
the only direct communication with him has been composed
solely of rather empty pleasantries and the one perfunctory
declaration that he has been served an apertif. Yet as Robert
takes his first (stunning) sip of what he has already learned
ex nihilo is expensive Champagne,4 and as he glances at the
other five guests seated at the table, he is poised to learn ex
nihilo without bound. How much new knowledge he acquires
is simply a function of how much time and energy he is will-
ing and able to devote to the form of learning in question. As
his water glass is filled, first with a wafer-thin slice of lemon
dropped in deftly with silver tongs, and then with the water
itself, he gets started:
For example, Robert now knows that his hosts find accept-
able his belief that they are quite wealthy. [They may not in
fact be wealthy (for any number of reasons), but they know
that Robert’s perceiving what they have enabled him to per-
ceive will lead to a belief on his part that they are wealthy, and
Robert knows that they know this.] Robert now also knows
that the menu, on the wine side, includes at least two ad-
ditional options, since otherwise his array of empty glasses
wouldn’t number three, one of which he knows is for water.
ldots
3 Learning Ex Nihilo is Ubiquitous
Of course, where there is one parable, countless others can
be found: Herman isn’t the black-tie kind of person. Given
a choice between the dinner Robert had versus one under the
stars in the wilderness, prepared on an open fire, Herman will
take the latter, every time. Having just finished such a meal,
Herman is now supine beside the fire, alone, many miles
from civilization in the Adirondack Park, on a very chilly but
crystal-clear summer evening. Looking up at the heavens, he
gets to thinking — and specifically gets to learning (ex nihilo,
of course). Herman knows next to nothing about astronomy.
As a matter of fact, in general, Herman doesn’t go in much
for academics, period. He sees a light traveling smoothly,
steadily, and quickly across his field of vision. Herman asks
himself: What is this thing? He hears no associated sound.
He isn’t inclined to take seriously that this is an alien space-
craft — unless what he is seeing is a total anomaly. Is it?
he asks himself. He waits and looks. There is another. This
seems routine, but if so, and if this is a UFO, the papers would
routinely be filled with UFO “sightings,” and so on; but they
aren’t. So, no, not a UFO. The light, he next notes, is travel-
ing too quickly to be a jet at high altitude, and in the dark like
this, no light pollution whatsoever, jets at high altitude are
hard to see. Herman notes that the object, as it moves, blocks
out his view of stars behind it. Ah! Herman now knows that
he has just seen a satellite in orbit, and with that done once,
before the night is out he will see two more. Herman never
4Robert perceives that his beverage is sparkling wine, that it’s
likely quite dear, and knows enough about both the main coun-
tries that produce such a thing (viz. USA, Spain, France, and Italy),
and linguistics, to reason to the belief that his beverage’s origin is
French, and hence that it’s Champagne.
knew that you could just lay down under these conditions and
see satellites; he also never knew that there are a lot of satel-
lites up there, going around Earth, but he reasons that since
his experience is from one particular spot on the surface of
Earth, it is likely to be representative of any number of other
locations, and hence there must be many of these satellites in
orbit. Herman has now come to learn many things, and the
night is still young.
Robert and Herman are at the tip of an infinite iceberg of
cases in which agents learn ex nihilo, both in rather mun-
dane fashion at fancy dinners and campfire dinners, and in
the more exotic cases seen in fiction (witness e.g. the eerie
ability of Sherlock Holmes to quickly learn ex nihilo myriad
things when meeting people for the first time, a recurring and
prominent phenomena in PBS’ Sherlock.). Moreover, it turns
out that learning ex nihilo is not only ubiquitous, but is also —
upon empirical investigation — a very powerful way to learn
in the academic sphere, where forcing oneself to be interested
enough to ask oneself questions, and then attempt to reason
to their answers, can pay demonstrable academic dividends
(Chi et al. 1994, VanLehn et al. 1992).
4 Learning Ex Nihilo Produces Knowledge
Please note that while it may seem to the reader that learning
ex nihilo is rather relaxed, free-wheeling, and epistemically
risky, the fact is that we have very high standards for declar-
ing some process, whether implemented in a person or a ma-
chine, to be learning. Put with brutal simplicity here, genuine
learning of φ by an agent, for us, must result in the acquisi-
tion of knowledge by the agent, and knowledge in turn con-
sists in the holding of three conditions, to wit: (1) the agent
must believe that φ holds; (2) must have cogent, expressible,
surveyable justification for this belief; and (3) φ must in fact
hold. This trio constitute the doctrine that knowledge con-
sists of justified true belief; we shall abbreviate this doctrine
as ‘k=jtb.’ By k=jtb, which reaches back at least to Plato,
most of what is called “learning” in AI today (e.g. so-called
“deep learning”) is nothing of the sort.5 But in the case of
our Robert and Herman, conditions (1)–(3) obtain with re-
spect to all the new knowledge we have ascribed to them, and
this would clearly continue to be true even if we added ad
infinitum propositions that they can come to learn ex nihilo,
stationary physically, but moving mentally.
5 Learning Ex Nihilo Includes a Novel
Solution to the Vexing Gettier Problem
Since Plato it was firmly held by nearly all those who thought
about the nature of human knowledge that k=jtb — until
the sudden, seismic publication of (Gettier 1963), which ap-
peared to feature clear examples in which jtb holds, but not
k. It would be quite fair to say that since the advent of Get-
tier’s piece, to this very day, defenders of k=jtb have been
rather stymied; indeed, it wouldn’t be unfair to say that not
5For an argument, with which we are somewhat sympathetic, that
contemporary “machine learning” fails to produce knowledge for the
agent that machine-“learns,” see (Bringsjord et al. 2018).
only such defenders, but in fact all formally inclined epis-
temologists, have since the advent of Gettier-style counter-
examples been scurrying and scrambling about, trying to pick
up the pieces and somehow build up again a sturdy edi-
fice. Our account of learning ex nihilo includes a formal-
and-computational solution to the Gettier problem, which in
turn allows AIs built with our automated-reasoning technol-
ogy (described below) to acquire knowledge in accord with
k=jtb. But first, what is the Gettier problem?
Gettier (1963) presents a scenario in which Smith has
“strong evidence” for the proposition
f Jones owns a Ford.
The evidence in question, Gettier informs us, includes that
“Jones has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory
owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just of-
fered Smith a ride while driving a Ford.” In addition, Smith
has another friend, Brown, whose whereabouts are utterly un-
known to Smith. Smith randomly picks three toponyms and
“constructs the following three propositions.”
g Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
h Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
i Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Of course, { f} ` g, { f} ` h, { f} ` i.6 “Imagine,” Gettier
tells us, “that Smith realized the entailment of each of these
propositions he has constructed by” f , and on that basis is
“completely justified in believing each of these three propo-
sitions.” Two further facts in the scenario yield the apparent
counter-example, to wit: Jones doesn’t own a Ford, and is
currently driving a rented car; and, in a complete coincidence,
Brown is in fact in Barcelona. Gettier claims, and certainly
appears to be entirely correct in doing so, that Jones doesn’t
know h, yet h is true, Smith believes h, and Smith is justified
in believing h — which is to say that jtb appears to be clearly
instantiated!
Learning ex nihilo includes an escape from Gettier: Encap-
sulated to a brutal degree here, we gladly allow that the char-
acters like Smith in Gettier’s (1963) cases do have knowledge
on the basis of a k=jtb-style account, but the knowledge in
question can be cast at any number of five levels, 1 (more
likely than not) the weakest and 5 (certain) the strongest.
Specifically, we hold that Smith knows at a level of 1, be-
cause belief in these cases is itself at a strength level of 1,
and that’s because the argument serving as justification for
belief in these cases only supports belief at that level. To our
knowledge, this proposed solution to the counter-examples in
question is new, though there are echoes of it in (Chisholm
1977).7 An AI-ready inductive logic that allows Gettier to be
6We are here by the single turnstyle of course denoting some
standard provability relation in a standard, elementary extensional
collection of inference schemata, such as that seen in first-order logic
=L1, a logical system discussed below. The disjunction is of course
inclusive.
7Echoes only. Chisholm’s main moves are flatly inconsistent
with ours. E.g., his definition of the longstanding jtb-based con-
cept of knowledge includes not merely that the agent is justified
in believing φ, but the stipulation that φ is evident for the agent
surmounted in this fashion is presented in (Govindarajulu &
Bringsjord 2017b).
6 On Logico-Mathematics of Learning ex
Nihilo
Is there a logico-mathematics of learning ex nihilo? If so,
what is it, at least in broad strokes? The answer to the first
of these questions is a resounding affirmative — but in the
present paper, intended to serve as an introduction to a new
form of human learning driven by reasoning, and concomi-
tantly as a challenge to learning-focused AI researchers (incl.
and perhaps esp. those in AI who pursue machine learning
in the absence of reasoning carried out in confirmable con-
formity with inference schemata), the reader is accordingly
asked to be be willing to rest content (at least provision-
ally) with but an encapsulation of the logico-mathematics in
question, and references (beyond those in the previous §) to
prior work upon which the formal theory of learning ex ni-
hilo is based. This should be appropriate, given that via
the present paper we seek to place before the community a
chiefly philosophical introduction to learning ex nihilo. We
present the core of the relevant logico-mathematics, starting
with the next paragraph. Our presentation presumes at least
some familiarity with formal computational logic (both ex-
tensional and intensional8) and late 20th- and 21st-century
(Chisholm 1977, p. 102). And his modifications of the j condition
in the jtb triad are internalist, whereas ours are externalist, inhering
as they do in formal structures and methods. Somewhat amazingly,
the learning-ex nihilo diagnosis and resolution of Gettier cases is as-
sumed in the literature to be non-existent. E.g., here is what’s said
about Gettier cases in what is supposed to be the non-controversial
and comprehensive SEP:
Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basi-
cally on the right track must choose between two differ-
ent strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is
to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier
cases as cases of justified belief. This was attempted by
Roderick Chisholm;12 . . . The other is to amend the JTB
analysis with a suitable fourth condition, a condition that
succeeds in preventing justified true belief from being
“gettiered.” Thus amended, the JTB analysis becomes a
JTB+X account of knowledge, where the ‘X’ stands for
the needed fourth condition. (Ichikawa & Steup 2012,
§3, “The Gettier Problem”)
Yet the learning ex nihilo-solution, while retaining the jtb kernel, is
based on neither of these two different strategies.
8Roughly, extensional logic invariably assigns a semantic value
to formulae in a purely compositional way, and is ideal for formaliz-
ing mathematics itself; this is why the logical systems traditionally
used in mathematical logic are such things as first-order and second-
order logic. Such logical systems, in their elementary forms, are
of course covered in the main AI textbooks of today, e.g. (Russell
& Norvig 2009, Luger 2008). In stark contrast, the meaning of a
formula φ in an intensional logic can’t be computed or otherwise
obtained from it and what it’s composed of. For a simple example,
if φ is ψ→ δ, and we’re in (extensional) zeroth-order logic (in which
→ is the material conditional), and we know that ψ if false, then we
know immediately that φ is true. But if φ is instead Baψ, where B
is an agent-indexed belief operator in epistemic logic, and ψ is what
agent a believes, the falsity of ψ doesn’t at all guarantee any truth-
automated deduction/theorem proving. (Learning ex nihilo
is, as we shall soon see, explicitly based upon automated
reasoning that is non-deductive as well, but automated non-
deductive reasoning is something we can’t expect readers to
be familiar with.) For readers in the field of AI who are strong
in statistical/connectionist ML, and/or reinforcement learn-
ing and Bayesian approaches/reasoning, but weak in formal
computational logic, in either or both of its deductive and in-
ductive forms, we recommend (Benzmu¨ller & Woltzenlogel-
Paleo 2016, Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017a), and then
working backwards through readily available textbooks and
papers cited in this earlier IJCAI-venue work, and in the next
two sub-sections.
6.1 Logical Systems and Learning Ex Nihilo
The concept of a logical system, prominent in the major result
known as Lindstro¨m’s Theorem,9 provides a detailed and rig-
orous way to treat logics abstractly and efficiently, so that e.g.
we can examine and (at least sometimes) determine the key
attributes that these logics have, relative to their expressive
power. A logical systemL is a triple
〈L ,I ,S〉
whose elements are, in turn, a formally specified language L
(which would customarily be organized in ways that are fa-
miliar in programming languages; e.g. types would be speci-
fied); an inference theory I (which would be a proof theory in
the deductive case, an argument theory in the inductive case,
and best called an inference theory when inference schemata
from both categories are mixed) that allows for precise and
machine-checkable proofs/arguments, composed of inference
schemata; and some sort of semantics S by which the mean-
ing of formulae in L are to be interpreted.
Each of the elements of the abstract triple the individuates
a given logical system can be vast and highly nuanced, and
perhaps even a substantive part of a branch of formal logic
in its own right. For example, where the logical system is
standard first-order logicL1, S will include all of established
model theory for first-order logic. Lindstro¨m’s Theorem tells
us (roughly) that any movement to an extensional logical sys-
tem whose expressive power is beyond L1 will lack certain
meta-attributes that many consider desirable. For instance,
second-order logic L2 isn’t complete, whereas L1 is. This
is no way stops AI researchers from working on and with
higher-order extensional logics.10
For present learning ex nihilo, the most important element
in the triple that makes for a logical system is I , which can
be viewed as a set of inference schemata.11 The reason is
value for Baψ. Here, the belief operator is an intensional operator,
and is likely to specifically be a modal operator in some modal logic.
9Elegantly covered in (Ebbinghaus et al. 1994).
10The formal verification of Go¨del’s famous ontological argument
for God’s existence, an argument that employs L3, has been veri-
fied by AI researchers; see e.g. (Benzmu¨ller & Woltzenlogel-Paleo
2014).
11For simple logical systems, the phrase ‘inference rules’ is often
used instead of the more accurate ‘inference schemata,’ and in fact
there is a tradition in places of using the former. Because even an
individual inference schema can be quite complex, and can involve
that learning ex nihilo is based on reasoning in which each
inference is sanctioned by some I ∈ I , and on the automa-
tion of this reasoning, including when the inference schemata
are non-deductive. In computer science and AI, a consider-
able number of people are familiar with automated deductive
reasoners; after all, Prolog is based on automated deductive
reasoning, using only one inference schema (resolution), in-
volving formulae in a fragment ofL1. Learning ex nihilo, in
contrast, is based on automated reasoning over any inference
schemata — not only deductive ones, but inductive ones, e.g.
ones that regiment analogical reasoning, abductive reasoning,
enumerative inductive reasoning, and so on. All the reasoning
patterns seen in inductive logic, in their formal expressions,
are possible as inference schemata employed in learning ex
nihilo.12
6.2 From Logical Systems to Cognitive Calculi
Because learning ex nihilo frequently involves the mental
states of other agents (as seen e.g. in the parable regarding
Robert), we employ a novel class of logical systems called
cognitive calculi, and they form part of the singular basis of
this new kind of learning. A cognitive calculus, put simply,
is a logical system in which L includes intensional opera-
tors (e.g. for such things as belief, desire, intention, emotional
states, communication, perception, and attention); I includes
at least one inference schema that involves such operators;
and the meaning of formulae, determined by some particular
S , because they can in their expressive power far outstrip any
standard, off-the-shelf semantics (such as possible-worlds se-
mantics), is generally proof-theoretic in nature.
6.3 The Learning Ex Nihilo Loop
Learning ex nihilo happens when an agent loops through time,
as follows in broad strokes: Identify Interest/Goal ⇒ Query
⇒ Discover Argument/Proof to Answer Query⇒ Learn ⇒
Identify Interest/Goal, etc. This cycle is at work in the para-
bles with which we began. We do not have space to detail
this persistent process. In particular, the management of the
agent’s interests (or goals) requires planning — but the em-
phasis in the present paper, for economy, is on reasoning. Be-
low we do discuss not only the AI technology that brings this
loop to life, but some simulation of the process in our earlier
parables.
meta-logical constructs and computation, talk of schemata is more
accurate. For instance, a common inference schema in so-called
natural deduction is
φ(a), where a is a constant in formula φ
∃xφ(x)
but all sorts of further restrictions can be (and sometimes are) placed
on φ(a), such as that it must be a ∆0 formula. As such things grow
more elaborate, it quickly makes precious little sense to call them
“rules,” and besides which many think of them as programs.
12For a particular example of formal, automated reasoning that
blends deduction with analogical reasoning, see (Licato et al. 2013).
For a readable overview of inference patterns in inductive logic that
we formalize and automate, see (Johnson 2016).
7 The Automation of Learning Ex Nihilo
But how do we pass from the abstract logico-mathematics of
learning ex nihilo to an artificial agent that can bring such a
thing to life? The answer should be quite obvious, in general:
We build an AI that can find the arguments that undergird the
knowledge obtained by learning ex nihilo. In turn, this means
that we need an automated reasoner of sufficient power and
reach that can pursue epistemic interests, and a planner that
can at least manage (e.g. prioritize) interests. This brings us to
the following progression, in which we now briefly describe
one such reasoner (ShadowReasoner), and then give an illus-
trative simulation made possible by this AI technology.
7.1 Automated Reasoner: ShadowReasoner
A large amount of research and engineering has gone into
building first-order theorem provers in the last few decades.
ShadowReasoner leverages this progress by splitting any
logic into a first-order core and the “remainder,” and then
calls a first-order theorem prover when needed. Briefly,
ShadowReasoner splits the inference schemata for a given
L ≡ 〈L ,I ,S〉 into two parts I1 and I>1. The first part I1 con-
sists of inference schemata that can be carried out by a first-
order theorem prover when the input expressions are shad-
owed down into first-order logic. The second part consists of
inference schemata that cannot be reduced to first-order rea-
soning. Given any problem in a logic, ShadowReasoner alter-
nates between trying out I>1 and calling a first-order theorem
prover to handle I1.
The core algorithm for ShadowReasoner has a theoretical
justification based on the following theorem (which arises
from the fact that first-order logic can be used to simulate
Turing machines (Boolos et al. 2003)):
Theorem 1
Given a collection of Turing-decidable inference schemata I ,
for every inference Γ `I φ, there is a corresponding first-order
inference Γ′ ` φ′.
We illustrate how ShadowReasoner works in the context
of a first-order modal logic employed in (Govindarajulu &
Bringsjord 2017a). Please note though there are some extant
first-order modal-logic theorem provers, built upon reduc-
tions to first-order theorem provers, they have some deficien-
cies. Such theorem provers achieve their reduction to first-
order logic via two methods. In the first method, modal oper-
ators are represented by first-order predicates. This approach
is computationally fast but can quickly lead to well-known in-
consistencies, as demonstrated in (Bringsjord & Govindara-
julu 2012). In the second method, the entire proof theory
is implemented in first-order logic, and the reasoning is car-
ried out within first-order logic. Here, the first-order theorem
prover simply functions as a programming system. The sec-
ond method, while accurate, can be excruciatingly slow.
ShadowReasoner uses the different approach alluded to
above — one in which it alternates between calling a first-
order theorem prover and applying non-first-order inference
schemata. When we call the first-order prover, all non-first-
order expressions are converted into propositional atoms (i.e.,
shadowing), to prevent substitution into non-first-order con-
texts, as such substitutions lead to inconsistencies (Bringsjord
& Govindarajulu 2012). This approach achieves speed with-
out sacrificing consistency. The algorithm is briefly described
below.
First we define the syntactic operation of atomizing a for-
mula, denoted by A. Given any arbitrary formula φ, A[φ] is
a unique atomic (propositional) symbol. Next, we define the
level of a formula: level : L → N.
level(φ) =

0;φ is purely propositional formulae; e.g. Rainy
1;φ has first-order predicates or quantifiers e.g. Sleepy(jack)
2;φ has modal formulae e.g. K(a, t,Sleepy(jack))
Given the above definition, we can define the operation of
shadowing a formula to a level.
Shadowing
To shadow a formula χ to a level l, replace all sub-formulae
χ′ in χ such that level(χ′) > l with A[χ′] simultaneously. We
denote this by S[φ, l].
For a set Γ, the operation of shadowing all members in the
set is simply denoted by S[Γ, l].
Assume we have access to a first-order prover PF . For a set
of pure first-order formulae Γ and a first-order φ, PF(Γ,φ)
gives us a proof for Γ `I1 φ if such a first-order proof exists;
otherwise PF returns NO.
Input: Input Formulae Γ, Goal Formula φ
Output: A proof of Γ `I φ if such a proof exists, otherwise fail
initialization;
while goal not reached do
answer = PF (S[Γ,1],S[φ,1]);
if answer 6= NO then
return answer ;
else
Γ′←− expand Γ by using any applicable I>1;
if Γ′ = Γ then
/* The input cannot be expanded further
*/
return fail
else
set Γ←− Γ′
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: ShadowReasoner Core Algorithm
7.2 Illustrative Simulation
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the dinner-party parable simulated
in the deontic cognitive event calculus (DCEC ) using Shad-
owReasoner within a graphical argument-construction sys-
tem; see (Bringsjord et al. 2008) for a similar, but less in-
telligent, system. See the appendix for a description of syn-
tax and inference schemata of DCEC . Figure 1 simulates
in pure first-order logic Robert’s learning that his drink is
an aperitif. Figure 2 is a proof in a cognitive calculus, viz.
assume
premise 1  holds(t , has(Robert, drink))
from {premise 1}
1
assume
premise 2  happens(pointsTo(server, drink), t )
from {premise 2}
2
assume
premise 3  happens(utters(server, aperitif), t )
from {premise 3}
2
assume
AXIOM 1  ∀ a,obj,phrase (happens(pointsTo(a, obj), t ) ∧ happens(utters(a, phrase), t )) ⇒ (name(obj) = phrase)
from {AXIOM 1}
2 2
assume
AXIOM 2  ∀ obj,phrase (name(obj) = phrase) ⇒ (obj = objectNamed(phrase))
from {AXIOM 2}
FOL ⊢ (Oracle)
goal  holds(t , has(Robert, objectNamed(aperitif)))
from {premise 1,premise 2,premise 3,AXIOM 1,AXIOM 2}
1
Figure 1: Dinner Party Example Part 1
assume
Premise 2  C(t , P(robert, t , happens(display(wealth, host), t )))
from {Premise 2}
0 0 0
assume
Premise 1  C(t , ∀ a,t happens(display(wealth, a), t) ⇒ holds(wealthy(a), t))
from {Premise 1}
0
CC ⊢
G1  B(robert, t , holds(wealthy(host), t ))
from {Premise 2,Premise 1}
1 0CC ⊢
G2  B(host, t , B(robert, t , holds(wealthy(host), t )))
from {Premise 2,Premise 1}
2 1 0CC ⊢
G3  B(robert, t , B(host, t , B(robert, t , holds(wealthy(host), t ))))
from {Premise 2,Premise 1}
3 2 1 0
Figure 2: Dinner Party Example Part 2
the one described in (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017a),
of Robert learning the following propositions: “Robert be-
lieves that his host is wealthy”, “The host believes Robert be-
lieves that his host is wealthy”, and “Robert believes that his
host believes Robert believes that his host is wealthy.”13 The
figures illustrate first-order and cognitive-calculus reasoners
(shown as FOL ` and CC `, resp.) being employed to derive
these statements. Automated discovery of the proofs in 1 took
∼ 0.1(ms), and the proofs in 1 took ∼ 0.9(s). We briefly ex-
plain the figures now. The two figures show assumptions that
are fed to the reasoner and output formulae that are proved by
the reasoner, as denoted by boxes containing the ` symbols
and the directions of the arrows. Each formula also has a hu-
man readable label displayed with a purple background. The
boxes with shaded backgrounds are the outputs, the shading
is not necessary but makes it visually easier to see the out-
puts. The text below each formula shows what assumptions
the formula is derived from or dependent upon.
8 ++++ Objections, Rebuttals
We now anticipate and rebut ++++ objections likely to
come from skeptics, including specifically those immersed in
forms of learning far removed from any notion of machine-
verifiable proof or argument enabled by inference schemata.
13 With background information ti < t j if i < j.
8.1 Objection 1: This isn’t learning from nothing!
The first objection is that ‘learning ex nihilo’ is a misnomer.
The rationale for this complaint is simply the reporting of an
observation that should be clear to all: viz. that the learn-
ing in question undeniably makes use of pre-existing stuff;
hence we’re not dealing with learning from nothing. In the
parable of the dinner party, e.g., Robert has brought his pre-
existing command of elementary arithmetic to the table; ditto
for much other pre-known propositional content. So how then
is it fair to speak of learning ex nihilo? It’s fair because obvi-
ously learning ex nihilo trades on the pre-existing concept of
creation ex nihilo, and that millennia-old conception allows
that the Almighty (by definition!) was around before the cre-
ation in question occurred. And of course this is just one part
of pre-creation stuff in creation ex nihilo: God presumably
needed to have a mental concept of a planet to create a planet.
We generally suspect that learning ex nihilo begins to kick
into “high gear” in the human sphere when children are so-
phisticated enough to exploit their prior knowledge of content
that requires, for its underlying representation, L1 and basic
modal logic. From the standpoint of logicist cognitive sci-
ence, rather than AI, this means that learning ex nihilo would
be aligned with the views of Piaget and colleagues [e.g. (In-
helder & Piaget 1958)], Stenning and colleagues [e.g. (Sten-
ning & van Lambalgen 2008)], Bringsjord and colleagues
[e.g. (Bringsjord et al. 1998, Bringsjord 2008)], and Rips and
colleagues [e.g. (Rips 1994, 1989)]. The goal of full formal-
ization and implementation of learning ex nihilo would likely
be regarded by these cognitive scientists as a welcome one.
8.2 Objection 2: Isn’t this just reasoning?
The second objection we anticipate is that learning ex nihilo
isn’t learning at all; it’s just a form of reasoning. In reply, any
process, however much it relies on reasoning, that does en-
able an agent running that process to acquire genuine knowl-
edge (and our j=tb definition of knowledge, note, is a very
demanding one) would seem to be quite sensibly classified as
a learning process. In fact, probably it strikes many as odd
to say that one has a form of machine learning that does not
result in the acquisition of any knowledge.
8.3 Objection 3: What about inductive logic
programming?
The objection here can be encapsulated thus: “What about
inductive logic programming (ILP)? Surely this established
family of techniques both uses formal logic, and results in
new knowledge.”
ILP is along the general lines of learning ex nihilo, agreed;
but ILP is acutely humble and highly problematic when mea-
sured against LEN, for reasons we give momentarily. Be-
fore giving these reasons, without generaity we fix a general
framework F Mooney (2000) to fix abduction and induction
in supposedly representative logicist fashion:
Given: Background knowledge, B, and observations
(data), O, both represented as sets of formulae in
first-order predicate calculus, where O is restricted
to ground formulae.
Find: An hypothesis H (also a set of logical formulae)
such that B∪H 6` ⊥ and B∪H ` O.
From F one can derive both induction and abduction, ac-
cording to Mooney: For the latter, H is restricted to atomic
formulae or simple formulae of the general form ∃xφ, and B
is — as Mooney says — “significantly larger” than H. For
induction, Mooney says that H is to consist of universally
quantified Horn clauses, and B is “relatively small” and may
even be the null set.
From an explain-the-extant-literature point of view, F is
at least somewhat attractive. For as Mooney (2000) points
out, this framework captures what many logic-oriented learn-
ing researchers in AI have taken induction and abduction to
be; this includes, specifically, ILP researchers (e.g. Muggle-
ton 1992, Lavrac˘ & Dz˘eroshki 1994). Unfortunately, despite
its explanatory virtue, F , when measured against human cog-
nition of the sort involved in learning ex nihilo, is embarrass-
ingly inadequate. As we have said, this can be shown effort-
lessly via many reasons. We quickly mention just four here.
Reason 1: F Runs Afoul of Non-Deductive Reasoning
Why should the combination of background knowledge and
a candidate hypothesis need to deductively entail some obser-
vation, as F says (via its use of `)? Suppose that as Smith
sits in his home office looking through a window he perceives
(ω) that a uniformed man with a FEDEX cap is approach-
ing Smith’s house, a small white box in hand. Smith has
no doubt learned that (δ) a delivery is about to be attempted,
but does it really need to be the case that, where B is back-
ground knowledge, B∪{ω} can be used to prove δ? No, it
doesn’t. Maybe it’s Halloween, Smith forgot that it is, and
the person approaching is in costume and playacting. Maybe
the approaching man is a criminal in disguise, merely cas-
ing Smith’s domicile. And so on. All that is needed is a fairly
strong argument in support of δ. And that argument can make
use of inferences that are deductively invalid, but valid as rea-
soning that is analogical, adbuctive, inductive, etc.14
Reason 2: F Leaves Aside Other Non-Deductive
Reasoning
This reason was revealed in the previous sentence: that sen-
tence refers to not just to abduction and induction, but also
to reasoning that is analogical in nature, and such reasoning
isn’t included in ILP. In fact, learning via analogical reason-
ing is often left aside in coverage of logicist learning of any
textbook variety.15 And as we have seen above, even Pollock
mentions only abduction and induction; he leaves analogical
reasoning aside. But if in an earlier case Smith had encoun-
tered not a FEDEX man, but rather a USPS mailman making a
delivery to his house, he may well have believed that the man
with the FEDEX cap was analogous, and hence was making a
delivery.
Reason 3: F Runs Afoul of Robust Expressivity
A quick but decisive third reason Mooney’s F explodes in the
face of real human cognition is that any expressivity restric-
tion on O and/or H is illogical, and certainly any specific re-
striction that O be restricted to ground formulae and/or that H
14Indeed, these inferences can even be formally valid in the in-
ductive logics that will undergird ALML; see below.
15E.g. learning by analogy isn’t included in AI’s definitive, other-
wise encyclopedic textbook: (Russell & Norvig 2009).
be confined to Horn-clause logic (or even for that matter full
FOL) is patently illogical. This can be seen in middle-school
classes that cover arithmetic, where even very young students
cook up and affirm hypotheses that are expressed using infini-
tary constructions beyond even full FOL. For instance: Stu-
dent Johnny is reminded of the definition of a prime number,
and then shown that 4 is equal to 3 plus 1, that 6 is equal to
5+1, that 8= 5+3, etc. Johnny is asked to consider whether
the next two even numbers continue the pattern. He observes
that 10 = 7+ 3 and that 12 = 9+ 3, and is now inclined to
hypothesize (H ′) that every even integer greater than 2 is the
sum of two primes. A natural form for H ′, where e1 is 2 and
the even numbers from there continue e2,e3, . . . is simply a
list L like:
e1 = p1+ p′1
e2 = p2+ p′2
...
Yet L cannot be expressed in finitary formulae,16 and even
if one squeezed L into finitary FOL, that would be done by
employing the same trick as is used for instance in axiomatic
set theory, where FOL is augmented with schematic formula
that denote an infinite number of instantiations thereof.17 Re-
gardless, even if by some miracle H ′ could be expressed in
some finitary extensional logic at or beneath FOL, the class-
room in question wouldn’t exactly operate well without the
teacher’s believing Johnny’s believing that H ′, and certainly
nothing like this fact is expressible in extensional logic (let
alone Horn-clause logic!).
Reason 4: F Ignores Thinking
The dictum that truth is stranger than fiction, alas, is fre-
quently confirmed by the oddities of contemporary AI re-
search. The fourth reason F is inadequate is a confirming
example. For while the framework F projects an air of be-
ing about thinking, in actuality it leaves thinking aside. In-
deed there’s a rather common fallacy at work in F , and its
promotion: the fallacy of composition. For while F does in-
clude some forms of reasoning, these forms (and even, for
that matter, all forms of reasoning put together) don’t com-
prise thinking; thinking includes the reasoning called out in
F as merely a proper part. To be more specific, in real and
powerful thinking, an hypothesis H can be wisely discarded
when there is evidence against it. (The rejection of the aether
drag hypothesis is a firm case in point.)
The fourth flaw infecting F can be easily unpacked: Real
learning is intertwined with the full gamut of human-level
thinking: with planning, decision-making, and communica-
tion. If there are no observations to learn from, an agent can
plan to get more observations. An agent can decide when
to learn and what to learn. Precious little substantive learn-
ing takes place without communication between teacher and
16It is naturally represented by an infinite conjunction, which the
logic Lω1ω allows.
17E.g., witness the Axiom Schema of Separation as a replacement
for Frege’s doomed Axiom V, shot down violently and decisively by
the famous Russell’s Paradox; see (Suppes 1972) for wonderfully
elegant coverage.
learner, including written communication. And finally, at the
highest end of the spectrum of powerful learning, learners
formalize learning itself, and learn more by doing so.
8.4 Objection 4: Does ShadowReasoner really
conform to the K=jtb thesis?
“It is not clear for me how and why the approach
produces true beliefs. Indeed, it seems to me that
the reasoning that is performed by ShadowRea-
soner is internal to it and that propositions that are
’produced’ are not necessarily true. In other words,
why does ShadowReasoner conform to the K=jtb
thesis?”
There is a tradition in agent-based modeling in which there
is a difference between a system S (e.g. ShadowReasoner)
and the system S modeling other agents. So truth is what the
system knows, and so that knowledge that P on the part of
an agent is inferred from that agent believing P, knowing that
some proof/argument for P exists, and the system’s knowing
that P.
8.5 Objection 5: Isn’t this just deduction
Cognitive calculi have been used to capture and model non-
deductive inference systems. See (Bringsjord & Licato 2015)
for one such example.
8.6 Objection 6: What about Lewis’ “Effusive
Knowledge”?
“You claim to have a solution to the Gettier problem, one
seemingly based on introducing different levels of knowledge
of p (why five?), based on the different levels of justification
one may have for p. This idea echoes Lewis’ (1996) epis-
temic contextualism, but does it really solve the Gettier prob-
lem? Anbd I don’t see any justification for why, say, level-5
jtb is to be equated with full knowledge?”
Actually, Lewis’ “Effusive Knowledge” paper espouses a
conception that is the opposite of what underlies learning ex
nihilo. Lewis holds that there is no knowledge in the Gettier
scenarios, because his definition for knowledge (which marks
a rejection of k=jtb) isn’t satisfied in these cases. Learning
ex nihilo entails that there is knowledge in these scenarios, but
reduced knowledge. If the degree of belief is k, then knowl-
edge partaking of this belief is of degree k as well. In Get-
tier’s original scenarios, knowledge is at the level of 2 (for
reasons too far afield to articulate under current space con-
straints). It seems never to have occurred to Lewis that if be-
lief comes in degrees, then knowledge (which surely includes
belief18) must itself come in degrees. In the context of formal
18Actually, Lewis asserts that there can be knowledge without be-
lief, because a timid student can know the answer, but has “no confi-
dence that he has it right, and so does not believe what he knows” (p.
556). In our formal framework, the situation is that the student be-
lieves, at a low level (1, say) that he knows (at some level k ≥ 1) the
answer, and as a matter of fact he does know the answer at level 1.
This scenario is provably consistent in our relevant cognitive calculi.
Not only that, but as far as we can tell, since in point of fact timid-
ity of this type often prevents successful performance, our formal
diagnosis has “real-worl” plausibility.
intensional logic (e.g. formal epistemic logic), Lewis posi-
tion/paper is from our formalist point of view weak, because
it hinges on the repeatedly asserted-without-argument claim
that in the case of a single-ticket lottery of size m, even when
the number of tickets is aribrarily large (eg m = 1 quadrillion),
one cannot know that a given ticket tk (1 ≤ k ≤ 1Q) will not
win. From the standpoint of learning ex nihilo, this is bizarre,
because surely one knows that in the next moment one’s com-
puter will not spontaneously combust, because such an event
is preposterously unlikely. (And looking back in time, surely
one knows that the computer sitting here now was there 10
seconds ago.) Moreover, Lewis rejects the very concept of
justification as part and parcel of knowledge; learning ex ni-
hilo by contrast is an AI-driven conception based on auto-
mated reasoning (automated deduction and automated ana-
logical, abductive, enumerative inductive etc reasoning).
As to levels of belief, in the case of an 11-valuded induc-
tive logic we use to undergird learning ex nihilo, 5 = certain,
4 = overwhelmingly likely, 3 = beyond reasonable doubt, 2
= likely, 1 = more likely than not. 0 is counterbalanced, and
then we have the symmetrical negative values. A belief at
level 5 corresponds to knowing things that Lewis (and every-
one else) agree that we know: e.g. knowing that 2+2=4.
8.7 Objection 7: What about QMLTP and isn’t
shadowing similar to existing schemes?
Note: we deal with /indexed/ modal operators (agent, time
and formulae for dyadic obligations). We can have aribtary
expressions for these indices. Our goals and systems are
much different from QMLTP (Raths & Otten 2012). Schemes
such as the Standard Translation for modal logics are seman-
tic in nature and apply only for propositional logics.
8.8 Objection 8: Examples are too simple and the
discussion is too philosophical
Our desire was to introduce, mostly philosophically, and to a
degree formally, LEN. We also point out connections to fa-
mous fictional detection, and cognitive psychology (learning
by posing questions to oneself, which is seminal work by Chi
et al). A purely formal treatment can we believe follow quite
naturally after this introduction, and fit the formal elements
we already give. Such a treatment includes further specifi-
cation of cognitive calculi where the inference schemata I
run the gamut of inductive logic; mechanisms for question-
generation; mechanisms for argument-discovery over these
inference schemata by automated-reasoning technques that
cover all major forms of reasoning; and an argument-checker
to validate discovered arguments. ShadowReasoner is the
current implemented system used for argument- and proof-
discovery, and checking. The full logico-mathematics of
LEN, and corresponding implementation, is something we
now feel we should give more of (thank you), but we are con-
cerned that jumping further in that direction, without seeking
to communicate to those in ML who don’t do formal logic,
might retard cross-paradigm collaboration on learning. In our
experience, many stat ML folks don’t know e.g. what a log-
ical system is even in the standard extensional sense we start
with (Lindstrom), and don’t know how it might connect to
everyday human activity. Since in the general case argument-
or proof-discovery in a cognitive calculus is far above what’s
Turing-computable, our strategy was to try to connect to ”ev-
eryday” parables first. As far as we can tell, the functions
learned by systems doing ML are Turing-computable; we feel
a special need to begin with such parables in order to show the
learning by reasoning in question isn’t rare, and apologize if
we have miscalculated here.
LEN comes with a novel solution to the Gettier problem
that has plagued (if not eviscertated) larges parts of epistemol-
ogy in philosophy for decades — and at the same time insists
upon a form of ML that produces propositional knowledge.
This is a form of knowledge that Gettier cases imperil.
Perhaps more importantly, we are concerned that ML folks
of the statistical/connectionist variety will not engage more
straightforwardly technical content. In our experience, while
you know and deal deeply with higher-order logics, stat/conn
ML folks don’t even know why zero-order logic might be rel-
evant to ML, or AI in general. We may be miscalculating, but
we are seeking to provide informal, philosophical toeholds to
bring somme of these people into collaboration.
8.9 Objection n: Frivolity?
Finally, some will doubtless declare that learning ex nihilo
is frivolous. What good is it, really, to sit at a dinner ta-
ble and learn useless tid-bits? This attitude is most illogical.
The reason is that, unlike what is currently called “learning,”
only persons at least at the level of humans can learn ex ni-
hilo, and this gives such creatures power, for the greatest of
what human persons have learned (and, we wager, will learn)
comes via learning ex nihilo. In support of this we could cite
countless confirmatory cases in the past, but rest content to
but point out that armchair learning ex nihilo regarding si-
multaneity (Einstein) and infinitesimals (Leibniz) was rather
productive.19
9 Conclusion and Next Steps
We have provided an introduction, philosophical in nature,
to the new concept of learning ex nihilo, and have included
enough information re. its formal foundation to allow those
conversant with logicist AI to better understand this type of
learning. In addition, we have explained that learning ex ni-
hilo can be automated via sufficiently powerful automated-
reasoning technology. Of course, this is a very brief paper.
Accordingly, next steps include dissemination of further de-
tails, obviously. But more importantly, what is the relation-
ship between learning ex nihilo and types of machine learning
that are based on artificial neural networks, Bayesian reason-
ing, reinforcement learning, and so on? These are other cur-
rently popular types of learning are certainly not logicist, and
hence nothing like a logical system, let alone a cognitive cal-
culus, are present. In fact, it’s far from clear that it’s even pos-
sible to construct the needed machinery for learning ex nihilo
19And for those readers with a literary bent, it should also be
pointed out that the great minds of detection, not only the afore-
mentioned Sherlock Holmes but e.g. Poe’s seminal Le Chevalier C.
Auguste Dupin, achieve success primarily because of their ability to
learn ex nihilo.
out of the ingredients that go into making these non-logicist
forms of learning.
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A Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus
DCEC is a quantified multi-modal sorted calculus and a
cognitive calculus. A sorted system can be regarded analo-
gous to a typed single-inheritance programming language.
We show below some of the important sorts used in DCEC .
Among these, the Agent, Action, and ActionType sorts are not
native to the event calculus.
Sort Description
Agent Human and non-human actors.
Time The Time type stands for time in the domain. E.g. simple,
such as ti, or complex, such as birthday(son( jack)).
Event Used for events in the domain.
ActionType Action types are abstract actions. They are instantiated at
particular times by actors. Example: eating.
Action A subtype of Event for events that occur as actions by
agents.
Fluent Used for representing states of the world in the event calcu-
lus.
Note: actions are events that are carried out by an agent.
For any action type α and agent a, the event corresponding to
a carrying out α is given by action(a,α). For instance if α
is “running” and a is “Jack” , action(a,α) denotes “Jack is
running”.
A.1 Syntax
The syntax has two components: a first-order core and a
modal system that builds upon this first-order core. The
figures below show the syntax and inference schemata of
DCEC . The syntax is quantified modal logic. The first-
order core of DCEC is the event calculus (Mueller 2006).
Commonly used function and relation symbols of the event
calculus are included. Other calculi (e.g. the situation calcu-
lus) for modeling commonsense and physical reasoning can
be easily switched out in-place of the event calculus.
The modal operators present in the calculus include the
standard operators for knowledge K, belief B, desire D, in-
tention I, etc. The general format of an intensional operator
is K(a, t,φ), which says that agent a knows at time t the propo-
sition φ. Here φ can in turn be any arbitrary formula. Also,
note the following modal operators: P for perceiving a state,
C for common knowledge, S for agent-to-agent communica-
tion and public announcements, B for belief, D for desire, I
for intention, and finally and crucially, a dyadic deontic op-
erator O that states when an action is obligatory or forbidden
for agents. It should be noted that DCEC is one specimen in
a family of easily extensible cognitive calculi.
The calculus also includes a dyadic (arity = 2) deontic op-
erator O. It is well known that the unary ought in standard
deontic logic lead to contradictions. Our dyadic version of
the operator blocks the standard list of such contradictions,
and beyond.21
Syntax
S ::= Agent | ActionType | Actionv Event | Moment | Fluent
f ::=

action : Agent×ActionType→ Action
initially : Fluent→ Boolean
holds : Fluent×Moment→ Boolean
happens : Event×Moment→ Boolean
clipped : Moment×Fluent×Moment→ Boolean
initiates : Event×Fluent×Moment→ Boolean
terminates : Event×Fluent×Moment→ Boolean
prior : Moment×Moment→ Boolean
t ::= x : S | c : S | f (t1, . . . , tn)
φ ::=

q : Boolean | ¬φ | φ∧ψ | φ∨ψ | ∀x : φ(x) |
P(a, t,φ) | K(a, t,φ) |
C(t,φ) | S(a,b, t,φ) | S(a, t,φ) | B(a, t,φ)
D(a, t,φ) | I(a, t,φ)
O(a, t,φ,(¬)happens(action(a∗,α), t ′))
A.2 Inference Schemata
The figure below shows the inference schemata for DCEC .
RK and RB are inference schemata that let us model idealized
agents that have their knowledge and belief closed under the
DCEC proof theory. While normal humans are not dedcu-
tively closed, this lets us model more closely how deliberate
agents such as organizations and more strategic actors rea-
son. (Some dialects of cognitive calculi restrict the number of
21A overview of this list is given lucidly in (McNamara 2010).
iterations on intensional operators.) R1 and R2 state respec-
tively that it is common knowledge that perception leads to
knowledge, and that it is common knowledge that knowledge
leads to belief. R3 lets us expand out common knowledge as
unbounded iterated knowledge. R4 states that knowledge of
a proposition implies that the proposition holds. R5 to R10
provide for a more restricted form of reasoning for proposi-
tions that are common knowledge, unlike propositions that
are known or believed. R12 states that if an agent s commu-
nicates a proposition φ to h, then h believes that s believes φ.
R14 dictates how obligations get translated into intentions.
Inference Schemata
K(a, t1,Γ), Γ ` φ, t1 ≤ t2
K(a, t2,φ)
[RK]
B(a, t1,Γ), Γ ` φ, t1 ≤ t2
B(a, t2,φ)
[RB]
C(t,P(a, t,φ)⇒K(a, t,φ)) [R1] C(t,K(a, t,φ)⇒ B(a, t,φ)) [R2]
C(t,φ) t ≤ t1 . . . t ≤ tn
K(a1, t1, . . .K(an, tn,φ) . . .)
[R3]
K(a, t,φ)
φ
[R4]
C(t,K(a, t1,φ1⇒ φ2))⇒K(a, t2,φ1)⇒K(a, t3,φ2)
[R5]
C(t,B(a, t1,φ1⇒ φ2))⇒ B(a, t2,φ1)⇒ B(a, t3,φ2)
[R6]
C(t,C(t1,φ1⇒ φ2))⇒ C(t2,φ1)⇒ C(t3,φ2)
[R7]
C(t,∀x. φ⇒ φ[x 7→ t]) [R8] C(t,φ1⇔ φ2⇒¬φ2⇒¬φ1)
[R9]
C(t, [φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn⇒ φ]⇒ [φ1⇒ . . .⇒ φn⇒ ψ])
[R10]
S(s,h, t,φ)
B(h, t,B(s, t,φ))
[R12]
I(a, t,happens(action(a∗,α), t ′))
P(a, t,happens(action(a∗,α), t))
[R13]
B(a, t,φ) B(a, t,O(a, t,φ,χ)) O(a, t,φ,χ)
K(a, t,I(a, t,χ))
[R14]
